China’s Catholic Church training centers on Xi Jinping ideology, omitting Vatican teachings and reinforcing Party control over religion.
Newsroom (08/05/2026 Gaudium Press ) China’s state-controlled Catholic Church convened a national training session in April that underscored the growing dominance of Chinese Communist Party (CCP) ideology over religious practice. Held at the Central Institute of Socialism in Beijing, the program focused entirely on the political framework of President Xi Jinping, with no reference to Vatican teachings or documents from Pope Leo XIV.
Nearly fifty representatives from the Patriotic Association of Chinese Catholics and the official Episcopal Conference attended. The stated aim was to strengthen ideological alignment between Catholic clergy and the Party. Bishop Li Shan, president of the Patriotic Association, opened the session by reiterating the government’s guiding framework: religious work in the “new era” must follow Xi Jinping’s directives, reinforce legal governance of religion, and ensure that Catholicism embodies “Chinese characteristics.”
Ideological Training as Core Curriculum
The structure of the training left little ambiguity about expectations placed on clergy. Participants studied Xi Jinping Thought, his speeches on religion, and policies related to the rule of law and “strict governance” of religious life. Additional sessions addressed online religious management and the role of religion in advancing national objectives.
Clergy were instructed to “study in depth and fully understand” Xi’s views, integrate “core socialist values” into preaching, and ensure these principles permeate pastoral work. Traditional Catholic teachings were notably absent, replaced by an emphasis on cultural nationalism and political loyalty.
Absence of Vatican Influence
The omission of any reference to the Vatican or papal authority stands out, particularly in light of Beijing’s frequent invocation of the 2018 Sino-Vatican agreement as a sign of cooperation. According to analysis cited by Bitter Winter, this absence reflects a structural priority: reshaping clergy allegiance so that Party ideology supersedes Church authority.
Even extracurricular elements of the program reinforced this objective. A scheduled visit to the Archaeological Museum of China aimed to build “cultural confidence” and deepen identification with the Party’s narrative of Chinese civilization.
Commitments to Political Loyalty
At the session’s conclusion, representatives from Jiangsu, Hubei, and Guizhou provinces pledged to elevate their “political standing,” uphold patriotic traditions, and advance the Sinicization of Catholicism. They also committed to developing a “theological system with Chinese characteristics” and aligning their work with the Party’s broader goals of modernization and national rejuvenation.
A Church Serving the State
The training session highlights a model of Catholicism increasingly oriented toward state priorities rather than traditional religious missions such as evangelization or sacramental life. As characterized by Bitter Winter, the Patriotic Church continues to function as an extension of CCP messaging, shaping religious practice to serve political ends.
Despite the 2018 agreement between Beijing and the Holy See, the dynamics observed in this training suggest that the balance of influence remains firmly tilted toward state control, with Party ideology defining the contours of Catholic life in China.
- Raju Hasmukh with files from Infocatholica
