An Overview of Beijing’s oversight of faith in 2025, advancing Sinicization, restricting minors’ religious education, and tightening clergy oversight.
Newsroom (05/01/2026 Gaudium Press ) As China bid farewell to 2025, the contours of its religious policy came into sharper relief. From new restrictions on clergy travel to unprecedented crackdowns on religious education, the Communist Party amplified its central message: the interests of the state come before the dictates of any faith.
“The state is greater than religion, the law of the nation greater than the rules of the Church,” declared Bishop Li Shan of Beijing at an official forum in April—an assertion that, more than rhetoric, functioned as a declaration of policy.
At the heart of this campaign lies the Party’s project of Sinicization—the ideological and cultural alignment of religions with socialism and Chinese nationalism. The year’s legislative and administrative developments suggest an accelerating push toward what General Secretary Xi Jinping has framed as “the building of a modern socialist country guided by Chinese civilization.”
Codifying Control
In March, the annual meetings of the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference (CPPCC) and the National People’s Congress once again functioned as key platforms for signaling policy direction. Premier Li Qiang, in his work report, underscored the need to “strengthen the law-abiding administration of religious affairs”—a notably stronger formulation than in prior years.
By April, the CPPCC convened a special forum on law and religion, where Catholic representatives and Party delegates alike echoed the government’s emphasis on governance through law. The event consolidated the message that all clergy, congregations, and believers must first be loyal citizens of the People’s Republic.
New laws reflected this tightening posture. On May 1, regulations governing religious activities by foreigners took effect, effectively limiting missionary work and public religious expression by non-Chinese residents. In September, the government unveiled one of its most controversial measures of the year: the Opinions on the Prevention and Management of Religious Propagation Activities Targeting Minors. The document codified a nationwide ban on introducing religion into schools, organizing youth camps, or even wearing religious symbols in educational environments.
More strikingly, the guidelines called for a renewed push of atheism and “Xi Jinping Thought” in classrooms and family education campaigns—signaling an effort to replace spiritual heritage with ideological orthodoxy from an early age.
The Digital Pulpit and the Party Line
The September 16 release of the Code of Conduct for Online Clergy extended state control to the virtual realm, stipulating that only authorized religious figures may stream sermons or share religious content online. Foreign priests and overseas Chinese clergy were explicitly excluded, marking a cross-border extension of Beijing’s regulatory reach.
Later that month, Xi Jinping convened the Politburo to reaffirm the Party’s religious doctrine. Since the 18th Party Congress in 2012, Xi noted, religion had been “placed under the comprehensive leadership of the CCP,” and the achievements of Sinicization were to be consolidated through tighter legal mechanisms and deeper ideological supervision. Religions, he argued, must “establish correct views” of China’s history and civilization—a phrase heavy with political connotation.
The shift toward legalism has also been visible in enforcement. In October, human rights organizations reported a coordinated crackdown on unregistered Christian congregations across ten major cities, including Beijing and Shanghai. Meanwhile, Buddhist monasteries, especially Tibetan ones, faced increased state involvement in leadership appointments, with officials reiterating China’s claim to name the Dalai Lama’s eventual successor.
The year ended as it began—with raids on unofficial religious groups just before Christmas, a symbolic closure to a year defined by systematized control.
Catholicism Under Surveillance
The Catholic Church, tested by decades of divided loyalties between Beijing’s Patriotic Church and Rome’s underground communities, remained a central focus of Chinese religious policy in 2025.
Early in the year, “Yihui Yituan”—the combined administrative bodies of the official Chinese Catholic Church—launched a national contest for homilies on Sinicization, blending theology with political education. In November, the association introduced a campaign titled Study the Regulations, Observe Discipline, Cultivate Virtue, and Build a Good Image, shifting internal training from spiritual to legal instruction.
One account by Bishop Cui Qingqi of Wuhan exemplified this new orthodoxy: “Freedom of belief,” he wrote, “does not exempt one from legal constraints. National interests and public order come first.”
While four new bishops were ordained in 2025 under the still-fragile agreement between Beijing and the Holy See, underground leaders continued to face harassment and administrative exile. By the end of the year, mainland China counted 99 bishops—80 officially recognized, 10 underground, and nine in irregular standing.
The year’s headlines also anticipated new restrictions: following the Shaolin abbot’s unsanctioned visit to the Vatican, authorities drafted a policy requiring clergy to submit passports for central oversight. The forthcoming Interim Regulations on Standardizing the Management of Passports and Travel Documents for Clergy—expected in 2026—appear designed to prevent independent contact between Chinese clerics and foreign religious institutions.
Faith Under Nationalization
The cumulative effect of these developments is unmistakable. In 2025, Beijing did not merely regulate religion; it redefined it as a function of state ideology.
What once began as an attempt to ensure “lawful administration” of belief has evolved into a sophisticated architecture of ideological discipline. From classrooms to cyberspace, from church pulpits to the monasteries of Tibet, every sphere where faith might inspire independent community or conscience is being systematically integrated into the framework of national loyalty.
The Party’s message to China’s faithful is unequivocal: religion may exist, but only insofar as it serves the state.
- Raju Hasmukh with files from Asianews.it
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